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findings and conclusons 


San Francisco Public Library 

Government tnformatfon Center 
San Francisco Public Library 
lOOUrkin Street, 5th Floor 
San Francisco, CA 94102 


Not to be taken from the Library 


Chapter I 

Chapter II 
Chapter III 

Chapter IV 
Chapter V 
Chapter VI 
Appendix A 

Appendix B 
Appendix C 

The Economic Aspects of San Francisco 
as a Port City 

Port Maritime Development 

Financing Port Maritime Operations 
and Development 

Port Organization and Management 

Non-Maritime Development 

San Francisco Bay Area Port Authority 

Members of the Committee and Their 
Statement of Approval 

Witnesses Testifying before the Committee 

Reference Material 




3 1223 08678 8438 


On March 14, 1972, Mayor Joseph L. Alioto appointed a fifteen member 
committee to be chaired by R. Gwin Follis. The Committee was charged 
with making recommendations for the long-range development of the 
San Francisco Waterfront, including its Port. 

The Correnittee held weekly public meetings over several months. Witnesses 
representing a wide variety of organizations testified with regard to the 
Port and the Waterfront. 

As a result of these hearings and numerous Executive Sessions, the Com- 
mittee has arrived at the Findings and Conclusions outlined in the 
following pages. 

A document containing a summary of the background material and excerpts 
of testimony supporting the findings is being published separately. A 
limited distribution will be made of the background publication, though 
it will be available to all who have a requirement. 

The report of Findings and Conclusions is separated into six chapters. 
Each chapter deals with a principal area of importance, and all are 
arranged so as to provide a sequential pattern of thought development. 

Chapters I through III deal principally with the maritime operation 
of the Port. Chapter V deals principally with the non-maritime 
activity of the Port. Certain conclusions were mentioned in more than 
one chapter. This was done for both clarity and emphasis. 

The Committee would like to thank the organizations and individuals who 
presented testimony. The Committee also is indebted to the Port staff 
for its excellent cooperation. The genuine concern for the City and 
the future of its Port by all who took part was evident throughout 
the Committee's work. 




Introduction : 

The Mayor's Port Committee early in its studies recognized the need to 
answer a fundamental question concerning the economic aspects of San 
Francisco's position as a port city. Specifically, the Committee asked 
whether or not maritime port capabilities play a significant role in 
supporting the San Francisco economy, and whether the discontinuance 
of these capabilities would present serious problems to the City and 
to its future. 

To this end, a sub-committee was appointed by the Chairman, Mr. Foil is, to 
study the economic aspects of the Port and its value to the City. This 
sub-committee worked concurrently on this question while participating in 
the full Committee's hearings and deliberations. 

In the course of arriving at its conclusions, the sub-committee benefited 
from extensively researched material already in existence concerning the 
San Francisco Port, from information submitted at public hearings by 
interested parties and concerned observers, from research and experience 
involving other port cities, and from a special research project commissioned 
expressly for the purpose of developing additional information on which the 
sub-committee could draw in reaching its final conclusions. The latter 
project was undertaken by the consulting firm of Gruen, Gruen + Associates, 
San Francisco. This report was presented to the full Committee and the 
Findings and Conclusions outlined in the following paragraphs were 

Findings : 

1. The City of San Francisco cannot afford a decision for abandonment of 
maritime port capabilities. Nor can it afford ~ through inattention 
or inaction--a general deterioration in the Port's capacity to handle 
general cargo shipments, particularly high value general cargo move- 
ments . 

The Committee is impelled to this finding by its assessment of both 
the short-term and the long-term consequences that would flow from 
such a development. Appreciation of the short-term consequences is 
best enhanced by reference to the direct employment and payroll impact 
traced to the Port's maritime activities. On the basis of conservative 
estimates, which virtually eliminate the possibilities of overstatement, 
it can be said that the Port's activities directly provided 20,000 jobs 
in 1970; the direct payroll involved in these jobs amounted to at least 
$244 million. 


Though there may be room for disagreement as to the proportion of 
these jobs and income that accrues to San Francisco residents, the 
Committee feels that one half is a reasonable estimate. Thus, the 
Port directly provides at least 10,000 jobs and an annual payroll of 
$122 million to San Francisco residents. 

Based on Gruen, Gruen + Associates' research, a conservative estimate 
is that an additional 14,000 jobs and an additional annual payroll 
of $135 million accrue to San Francisco residents who are involved 
in the provision of goods and services to individuals and firms di- 
rectly involved in Port activities. Thus, the immediate impact of the 
Port activity on the economy of San Francisco conservatively is esti- 
mated at 24,000 jobs and $257 million in annual payroll. Clearly, 
the elimination of these jobs and their attendant payrolls would 
tend to have a multiplier effect on the local economy which would 
greatly increase the ultimate erosion of local job opportunities, of 
local trade volume, and of the local tax base -- while also tending to 
increase the demand for social services that inevitably accompanies 
inadequate job opportunities. 

In this connection, it is worth noting that many, if not most, of 
the jobs involved in the activities of the Port are "blue collar," 
involving heavy minority representation. San Francisco is not pro- 
ducing enough of these jobs; and when they are destroyed, new sub- 
stitutes are not readily forthcoming. In short, the elimination of 
these jobs would present the job holders with severe problems in job 
relocation within the City. 

2. The second finding, and one that is inextricably related to the first, 
is that there is no practical way in which San Francisco can neglect 
its Port maritime operations and protect itself against the economic 
consequences of job losses, payroll shrinkage and tax base erosion. 

This is based on the conviction that San Francisco's shipping volume 
is not automatically or even easily transferred to other Bay Area 
ports where it conceivably could continue to support the job and 
income requirements of San Francisco residents. The fact is, a large 
volume of the shipping that moves through San Francisco's Port reflects 
the traditionally dominant position of San Francisco as a port city 
and the quality of its peripheral support devices -- factors that have 
little to do with existing location advantages. Much of this volume 
is retained in San Francisco through custom and tradition even though 
the competitive thrust of other ports up and down the West Coast 
indicates that the cargo could move through those ports quite as easily 
and efficiently as through Bay Area ports. 

A winding down of San Francisco's Port capability would present all 
shippers using San Francisco docks with the requirement for a deci- 
sion as to future shipping patterns. Raising this question, in turn, 
would lead to a decision in many cases to use West Coast ports other 
than Bay Area ports. 

San Francisco cannot simply abandon competitive port capability and 
expect the business to be retained within the Bay Area. Any attempt 


to do so would produce a significant redirection of shipping volume 
to West Coast ports other than those in the Bay Area. The consequences 
that would flow from such a redirection are spelled out in the finding 
presented immediately following. 

3. The third finding is that the City's vast network of marine-related 

services -- including distribution systems, financial capabilities, legal 
processing services, governmental agencies and other general cargo 
related businesses — requires for its viability and continued growth a 
reasonably strong competitive performance on the part of Bay Area ports 
vis-a-vis the other West Coast ports. 

By virtue of its economic history and tradition, San Francisco developed 
such a complex of trade-oriented services (confined largely to the pri- 
vate sector) long before any other West Coast city; it still predominates 
in the excellence and comprehensiveness of these peripheral services. 
If, however, a considerable redirection of West Coast general cargo trade 
should come about as a result of San Francisco's neglect of competitive 
port operations—the Committee believes this would be highly likely-- 
the volume of general cargo moving in and out under the Golden Gate 
Bridge would suffer further and more rapid erosion. Under these cir- 
cumstances, San Francisco could not avoid entering a period of steady 
decline in all those technical and professional services that have 
grown up over more than a century to serve the world's marine commerce 

The Committee would not wish to quantify the effects of such a decline 
in terms of job losses, income losses, etc., in the character and 
dynamism of the City over a long period of time. Such an assessment 
is out of the area of facts and into the realm of conjecture. The 
Committee believes that decisions should be based on the assumption 
that a failure on the part of San Francisco to maintain the critical 
mass of shipping required for the support and continued growth of 
those activities that are Port-related and Port-influenced would have 
serious adverse consequences for the future of San Francisco. 

4. The fourth finding is contrary to the generally held assumption that 
San Francisco's Port has some geographic disadvantage. It was found 
that there is no reason to believe that the Port of San Francisco has 
geographic, demographic or transportation disadvantages relative to 
other Bay Area ports. 

Repeated testimony and specific questioning have verified that San 
Francisco has advantages vis-a-vis other Bay Area ports. 

Rail freight rates from San Francisco to Chicago or New York are iden- 
tical to those of Oakland, Richmond, etc. Shipping times are the same. 
In fact, the cargo from vessels unloading in San Francisco destined for 
the East probably goes on the same train as those of vessels unloading 
in other Bay Area ports on the same day. 

The Port has three site locations, which collectively cover 183 acres, 
now available on the South Waterfront. Sufficient land for new maritime 
Port operations and expansion is thus immediately available. 



Maritime activities of the Port of San Francisco are vital to the 
economy of the City and the entire Bay Area. The Port must there- 
fore be developed aggressively on an economically rational basis. 





Having concluded that the Port is a major factor in San Francisco's 
economic well-being, which must be developed aggressively on an 
economically sound basis, the Conmittee presents its recommendations on 
how the development should be effected. These are based on the premise 
that the Port management, rather than the Committee, should be best 
qualified to evaluate specific projects. 

Financing future Port developments is reviewed separately in the following 
chapter of this report. Also, while an effective marketing capability is 
necessary to implement a development program successfully, specific recom- 
mendations with respect to organization and management are covered in a 
separate chapter (IV). 

Findings : 

1. Development of maritime facilities should be considered separately 
from non-maritime development. 

2. The maritime industry is undergoing constant change in those areas 
that impinge on development of Port facilities, i.e., ship size, cargo 
handling systems, land area needs, interface with other transportation 
modes, etc. 

3. Sound economic development of the Port depends on its ability to adapt 
to future requirements of the maritime industry. 

4. The Port's physical characteristics, i.e., frontage, water depth and 
backup land, are suitable for development of flexible maritime service 
capabilities in new or modernized facilities. The natural water depth 
adjacent to the San Francisco Port facilities is greater than at other 
Bay Area port locations, a significant competitive advantage in serving 
larger vessels. 

5. The Port historically has undertaken new developments only after long- 
term use agreements have been reached with tenants. In order to be 
competitive with other areas and other ports in the Bay Area, some 
elasticity in this policy is necessary. Specifically, where a need 
for a facility is apparent and bona fide interest in such a facility 
is evident, some venture development may be necessary to supplement an 
aggressive promotion and marketing effort by the Port. 


6. The Port has not achieved an effective marketing capability in its 
present organizational structure. 

7. The policy-making and budget procedures imposed on the Port are 
cumbersome, time-consuming and unrealistical ly restrictive, which 
make it non-competitive with other ports. 

8. Aggressive development of the Port requires, in addition to stepped 
up promotional and marketing capability, that the service it provides 
and the costs for them be competitive with other ports. In this con- 
nection, the following four present Port functions should be assumed 
by the City in its established departments: 

a. Harbor police 

b. Fireboat operation 

c. Street maintenance 

d. Garbage collection and street cleaning 

These activities represent a present cost burden to the Port of 
approximately $1,100,000 per year, which other ports do not bear 

9. In terms of overall value to the City, the present passenger ship 
terminal is inadequate and, while not potentially profitable to the 
Port per se, should be upgraded to meet the growing number of cruise 
ship passengers using the Port of San Francisco. 


1. Management of the Port should continue its present efforts to develop 
planned projects in the South Waterfront area. The properties involved 
should be prepared for construction concurrently with an aggressive 
marketing effort to acquire long-term tenants. While specific needs 

of tenants must be taken into account, sufficient flexibility should 
be retained to accommodate future requirements where tenants change 
or their requirements are altered. 

2. The Port n^ist be granted suffici ent management latitude to develop 

an effective promotional and marketing capability. The Port management 
must then be held responsible for a successful application of this 
capabil i ty. 

3. If reasonable interest on the part of one or more responsible prospec- 
tive tenants is evident for any of the major development projects 
under consideration, or if there is a need for a facility on a non- 
exclusive, i.e., public-use basis, the Port should move ahead on a 
venture basis with phased facility development to anticipate industry 
needs, particularly where competitive pressures pose the threat of loss 
of large or long-term customers. 

4. The Port should review with existing tenants adequacy of present faci- 
lities and services for future requirements. 

5. The Port should endeavor to maintain in its development program a 
varied capability to meet as wide a range of specialized needs, such 


as container, LASH, break bulk, RORO and bulk, among others, as are 
consistent with sound economic policy. 

6. The Mayor and Board of Supervisors should transfer Port responsibility, 
and the cost for harbor police, fireboat operation, street maintenance 
and street cleaning to appropriate City departments. 

7. The Port should provide as economically as feasible a modern, attrac- 
tive passenger terminal facility. 




Introduction : 

This chapter deals with the fundamental issue of how the Port's operations 
and development are to be financed and the implications of the policies 

In the past the Port's policy has been to operate on a self-sustaining 
basis and it has not been a direct burden to the taxpayers of San Francisco 
or the State of California. Recognition of changing attitudes toward 
public use in areas under Port control may require revision of this policy. 
Should this occur, other sources of income should be provided. In addition 
to possible subsidy or taxing power, the Port should look to certain 
economies of operation in order to become financially sound. Subsidy 
of the maritime activities of the Port by income from its non-maritime 
properties should not be allowed to lead to poor exploitation of the non- 
maritime properties. 

Findings ; 

1. Most capital improvements of the Port have been and can be financed 
by general obligation and revenue bonds. 

2. The Port never has been a direct burden on the taxpaye>^s of San Francisco. 
However, it has benefited from non-maritime revenues t.iat could be 
considered a form of subsidy. This support should continue, but not 

to such an extent that it would be harmful to other values the 
citizens wish to enhance, such as open space and access to the Bay 

3. Tax money spent to aid and enchance the Port's operations may be an 
excellent investment, one which provides many jobs and direct economic 
benefits from an active, vital Port. Thus, should the revenues from 
non-maritime Waterfront properties be inadequate to meet justifiable 
Port needs, recourse to tax money should be made. 

4. The majority of ports on the West Coast operate as relatively autonomous 
agencies, largely independent of local government. Some even have in- 
dependent taxing powers and most are subsidized through tax revenues, 
federal grants, airport revenues or oil royalties. The Port of San 
Francisco enjoys none of these. 


5. The Port maintains, out of its budgeted funds, certain functions that 
other West Coast ports do not. The four functions that should be 
transferred out of the Port's budget are fireboat operation, street 
maintenance, harbor police and street cleaning. These total approxi- 
mately $1 ,100,000 per year. 

6. The belt line railroad currently is losing money at a rate of 
approximately $500,000 per year. 

7. The Port has not received any substantial federal grants, although 
efforts are being made to obtain these. 

8. The Port's financial management has adhered to the political commitment 
to remain in a self-sustaining posture. This policy may not serve the 
best long-term interest of San Francisco. 

Conclusions : 

1. The Port can and should continue to finance it's capital improvements. 

2. The Port's operations are hamstrung by cumbersome budget procedures. 

3. Subsidizing of the Port's operations should be effected if revenues 
from both maritime and non-maritime activities are inadequate to 
support justifiable Port development. 

4. The Port should be more autonomous and either should have a simple 
procedure for receiving tax aid in an overall amount designed to meet 
the programs and financial needs of the Port or else should be given 
limited, independent taxing powers. 

5. The City should assume the functions of operating the. fireboat, 
repairing streets, providing harbor police and street cleaning 

6. Operation of the belt line railroad in the North Waterfront area 
should be discontinued. In the South Waterfront an alternative 
means to the Port providing the service should be found. 

Approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission must be obtained 
on the North Waterfront discontinuance. Consent of the U.S. Army, 
due to contractual commitments, is also necessary. 

7. Federal aid should be sought by the Port on a vigorous, sustained basis. 

8. Financial management of the Port should be responsive to a sound business 
analysis of the Port's needs in order to assure a vital Port that con- 
tributes directly and indirectly to the economy of San Francisco. 
Financial management should not be limited to "staying off the tax rolls," 




Introduction : 

The Port of San Francisco is engaged in a highly competitive enterprise. 
Its status as a City department imposes restrictions on Port management, 
which inhibit its ability to meet successfully the challenges of other 
Bay Area and West Coast ports. 

The Committee has concluded that the Port's organizational structure must 
be more responsive to the needs of its customers if the Port is to succeed 
as a competitive entity in its industry. 

The Conmittee believes the question of management capability of the 
Port lies outside its competence. Testimony presented to the Committee 
raised some criticism concerning marketing and promotion activities and 
failure to provide the full range of services rendered by competitive 
ports. The Committee believes this situation is principally attributable 
to organizational weaknesses rather than management deficiency, or in any 
event first requires the establishment of a management structure capable 
of reacting promptly and effectively to competitive conditions. 

Findings : 

1. The principal finding is that t'le Port lacks sufficient management 
autonomy to provide facilities and services competitive with those 
offered by other ports in the Bay Area and on the West Coast, and 
to enable it to capitalize on its natural advantages. 

2. The Port Commission enjoys only limited authority in setting policy 
and administering Port affairs because of the high degree of control 
over Port financial activities exercised by the Mayor and the Board 
of Supervisors. 

3. The present procedures for Port budget approval and expenditure of 
funds severely hamper efficient management of the Port. 

4. Civil Service coverage of top-level management positions limits 
flexibility in obtaining superior personnel for these jobs. 

5. Other principal West Coast ports enjoy a high degree of management 
autonomy, which accounts in large part for the slippage in the 
competitive position of the Port of San Francisco. 


6. An acceptable compromise between management autonomy of the Port and 
financial accountability of the Port to the Mayor and the Board of 
Supervisors can be effected. As long as the Port remains financially 
sound, generating sufficient income, including use of non-maritime 
income, to cover its operating and debt service requirements, the 
Mayor and the Board of Supervisors need only provide broad, overall 
supervision of the Port. 

Conclusions : 

1. The Port Commission should have ultimate responsibility for development 
of long-range facility planning, financing and the development of 
maritime and non-maritime properties. 

2. The Mayor and the Board of Supervisors should limit their responsibility 
to annual program and financial reviews to ascertain whether or not 

any supplemental City funds are required for operation of the Port. 
If not. Port Commission approval of the Port budget should stand. 

3. Because of the highly competitive nature of the Port's principal 
activities, the Port Commission should function in a manner similar 

to a corporate Board of Directors with similar membership qualifications. 
The members should be able to devote the necessary time to this 

4. In addition to the Director, the Deputy Port Director, Executive 
Assistant and heads of principal departments and bureaus should be 
exempt from Civil Service requirements. 

5. The management of the Port should have full authority to operate within 
approved budget limits in accordance with such control procedures as 
may be prescribed by the Port Commission. 




Introduction : 

Recommendations as to the non-maritime development of Waterfront properties 
under control of the San Francisco Port Commission is a most critical issue. 

In this chapter we consider the non-maritime portions of the Waterfront 
in respect to serving the City and as an attraction to augment the tourist 
trade, a major contributor to the economy of the City. 

Findings : 

1. Non-maritime development on Port-controlled properties is a responsibility 
of the San Francisco Port Commission. 

2. The control and development of the non-maritime facilities is a 
separate and distinct function from the control and development of 
the maritime facilities. 

3. The geographical area of non-maritime use is primarily a large portion 
of that section of Port-controlled properties north of the Bay Bridge, 
extending to, and including. Fisherman's Wharf. Also included are areas 
south of the Bay Bridge that have been designated for public use. 

4. The amount of revenue from non-maritime activities required to support 
maritime functions of the Port is subject to change and thus will 
require constant reassessment. 

5. There are three classifications of piers north of the Bay Bridge — 
those currently serving maritime capabilities, those no longer 
serving maritime needs, and those that might be converted to more 
effective non-maritime use. 

6. The non-maritime development must comply with the existing laws and 
commitments and the desires of the public involving balance between 
environmental and economic considerations. The existing Bay Conservation 

. and Development Commission (BCDC) law prohibits certain non-maritime 
development, yet such development may be in the best interests of the 
publ ic. 



1. Management responsibilities for non-maritime activities should be 
separated from maritime responsibilities. 

2. Non-maritime property development activities should be undertaken on 
a basis of making the most effective economic and publicly beneficial 
use of the assets available. 

3. The Port should consider making agreements and leases for development 
by a non-profit corporation or similar entity permitted under the City 
Charter and State Transfer Agreement to undertake the overall develop- 
ment of non-maritime properties. 

4. Preparation of a Special Area Plan for non-maritime development must 
be undertaken and efforts made to conform to, or if necessary, 
amend the BCDC law to permit implementation of this plan. This plan 
must conform to the City's Master Plan. 

5. It should be the goal of the Port Commission to develop its controlled 
properties in a manner commensurate with their highest and best use, 
achieving a balance between environmental and economic considerations, 
including a phased relocation of shipping activities to south of the 
Bay Bridge. 




Introduction : 

The desirability of developing a Bay Area Port Authority was referred to 
repeatedly throughout the investigation. 

Finding : 

1. The development of a regional port complex capable of providing total 
shipping services on an efficient and highly competitive basis is 
the key to the future success of all Bay Area ports. 

Conclusions : 

1. The Committee believes the development of such an authority would be 

2. The City cannot delay or interrupt the future development of the Port 
pending creation of such an authority, and should move promptly and 
aggressively to strenghten the Port's competitive position. 



The foregoing report, dated January 11, 1973, and consisting of fifteen 
pages, is adopted by the undersigned. 


R. Gwin Foil is 

||.| William H. Chester 
II ^^^^ 

II William D. Evers 
ll BCDC 

Mortimer Fleishhacker, Jr. 


James E. Stretch 

Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company 

Alan C. Furth 

Southern Pacific Co. 

City Planning Commission 

Richard N. Goldman 

Citizens Waterfront 

Commi ttee 

Leslie C. Peacock 


Dr. Cyril C. Herrmann 
Arthur D. Lit^^le, Inc. 

XW^ ^ 

Cyril I. Magnin 

Port of San Francisco 

Edward L. Turner 

Marine Cooks and 
Stewards Union 

Ronald Pelosi 

Board of Supervisors 

'Norman Scott 
Natomas Company 

Chamber of Commerce 



Witnesses who testified before the Mayor's Port Committee: 

Joe Balardi 

Local Joint Executive Board 
of Culinary Workers 

Curtis J. Baldwin 
Telegraph Hill Dwellers 

Robert Blackwell 
Department of Commerce/ 
Maritime Affairs 

Joe Bodovitz 

Bay Conservation and Development 

Gary I. Campagna 

Bay Area Management Co. 

William Chester 
International Longshoremen and 
Warehousemen's Union 

Monseignor Matthew Connolly 
Apostleship of the Sea 

Joe Diviny 

International Brotherhood/ 

Chester Eschen 
California Stevedore and 
Ballast Company 

Worth B. Fowler 

Richard Gryziec 

San Francisco Tommorrow 

Jim Herman 

Ships Clerk Union (ILWU #34) 

Dr. Cyril Herrmann 
Arthur D. Little, Inc. 

Al Hicks 
Model Cities 

Jack Howard 

Consolidated Freightways 

John Jacobs 

Kirk Kiekhefer 

San Francisco Junior Chamber 
of Commerce 

Janice Kittredge 

Save S.F. Bay Association 

Mrs. Amy Meyer 

People for Golden Gate National 
Recreation Area 

Vincent Mooney 
Universal Terminals 

Gene Morzenti 
Telegraph Hill Survival 

Jay Ostrow 

Western Pacific Railroad 
George Gmelch 

Pacific Far East Lines, Inc. 

El liot Schrier 
Manalytics, Inc. 

Herman Solomon 

Pacific Coast Iron Shipbuilders 
District - Marine Lodge 

Dwight Steele 
Sierra Club 

Phillip Steinberg 
American Institute of Merchant 

Clement E. Shute 

Justice Department - Office of Attorney 

Appendix B - Witnesses continued 

Jack Teubner 
Connell Brothers 

Edward Turner 

Marine Cooks & Stewards Union 

Robert W. Walker 
Santa Fe Railway 

Morris Weisberger 

Sailors Union of the Pacific 

Miriam Wolff 

San Francisco Port Commission 
Edward Laws on 

San Francisco Chamber of Commerce 



September, 1950 

A Special Report - Promotion and 
Improvement of the Port of San Francisco 

San Francisco Chamber of Commerce 


A Plan for Fisherman's Wharf 

The San Francisco Port Authority- 

September, 1966 

Port of San Francisco - An In-depth Study 
(Shows why Port is needed in San Francisco) 
Arthur D. Little 

November, 1967 

San Francisco's Mariti-me Future 

(Follow-up on September 1966 report on how to 

develop Port) 

Arthur D. Little 

January, 1968 

San Francisco Port, . .Asset or Liability? 
A SPUR Report 

January, 1968 

Port of San Francisco Ocean Shipping Handbook 
Port of San Francisco 


North Waterfront Plan 

City Planning Department 

June, 1969 

South Bayshore Study: A Proposed Development 

San Francisco City Planning Department 

January, 1970 

Proposal for a Passenger Ship Terminal Center 
prepared for S.F. Port Commiss ion/U. S . Steel 

Skidmore, Owings & Merrill 

page two 

December, 1970 

Report of Waterfront Committee 
Committee and Gruen, Gruen & Associates 

September, 1971 

What to Do About the Waterfront - A Report 
to the Citizens Waterfront Committee 

Livingston and Blayney, City & Regional 

September, 1971 

Central Waterfront Public Access Study - 
Phase One 

(Bay Bridge to India Basin) 
Port of San Francisco 

October, 1971 

San Francisco Port Needs, Shipping and Area 

(10-year capital improvement program) 
Port of San Francisco 

January, 1972 

Resolution No. 70-23/Re Master Plan of Port 
Commission on Areas Contiguous to Water 

Port of San Francisco 

January, 1972 

Evaluation of comments and proposals made 
concerning the San Francisco Waterfront and 
recommendations of possible changes in the 
Master Plan 

Joint Port and City Planning 


Water Front Master Plan 
(four chart presentation) 
Joint Port and City Planning 

January, 1969 

San Francisco Bay Plan 

San Francisco Bay Conservation & Development 
Commiss ion 

page three 

March, 1969 San Francisco Bay-Delta Water Quality 

Control Program/ Final Report 

State Water Resources Control Board/ 
Above Program 

The Master Plan of the City and County 
of San Francisco 

San Francisco City Planning Commission